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I. INTRODUCTION
When a DDB Needham Worldwide executive organized a white water
rafting trip for corporate executives and potential clients, no one thought
that the trip would result in anything more than a pleasant diversion.
But when all five participants died after having been thrown from the
raft, their deaths prompted questions about the nature of the outing and
whether the participant's families were entitled to compensation under
the workers' compensation law.'
In a country where 65% of employers surveyed sponsor firm softball
teams, and nearly half organize golf outings, it cannot be said that busi-
ness ends at 5:00 and pleasure begins at 5:01.2 Company sponsored social
events mix business and pleasure, and maintaining good employee morale
has become engrained in corporate strategy. Social and recreational ac-
tivities are the primary vehicle for developing positive employee rela-
tions. Cultivating goodwill among employees results in increased effi-
ciency at the work place, and injuries sustained at these events, therefore,
are sufficiently related to employment to bring them within a state's
workers' compensation law.
I Lipman, Firms' Outings Pose Liability Dilemma, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1988,
at 37, col. 3.
'Id.
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1991
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
This note explores an employer's potential liability when a worker is
injured at a company sponsored event. Part two briefly outlines the history
of workers' compensation law placing particular emphasis on the public
policies that gave rise to implementation of the workers' compensation
system. Part three analyzes workers' compensation statutes, examines
the tests used to determine compensability and discusses the effect of
exclusive remedy provisions on a worker's tort recovery.
The last section discusses the methods used to determine whether injury
sustained at a company sponsored event falls within workers' compen-
sation statutes. It asks whether workers' compensation statutes are
equipped to deal with injuries sustained at firm functions and analyzes
recent legislative enactments that deal directly with injury sustained
during recreational activity. The section focuses on the advantages gained
by the employer by compensating the worker for injury sustained at a
company sponsored recreational activity. The public policy implications
of awarding compensation are examined as are the limits to compensating
for injury sustained at a company's social outing.
II. HISTORY OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
The arguments regarding compensating an employee for injuries sus-
tained at company sponsored recreational activities must be placed in the
framework of workers' compensation statutes. The rapid growth of in-
dustry in the nineteenth century brought both a dramatic increase in on-
the-job injury and new awareness of the need to compensate for those
injuries. During the early stages of industrial development, a worker
could not sue his employer for injuries sustained at work.3 The massive
number of unemployed as well as the numerous diseased and maimed,
made those employed seem fortunate. Society considered an employee's
recovery for workplace injury unjust to the employer who so graciously
provided that employee with a steady income at a fair wage. 4
Early tort law concepts were equally at odds with the new industrial
system. While technically an employee could recover against an employer
under a theory of negligence, it was an insurmountable task for the
employee to prove the necessary elements of negligence. 5 The main ob-
stacle frustrating recovery was establishing the causal link between the
3 Epstein, The Historic Origins and Economic Structure of Workmen's Com-
pensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 777 (1982).
4 Epstein, supra note 3, at 777-78. Much of the feeling that industrial workers
were of the privileged class arose from the perceived contrast between agricultural
life and industrial life. As a consequence, farmers and other agricultural workers
could find no justification for compensating industrial workers when they were
forced to bear the burdens of their injuries without outside aid.5 Friedman, Social Change and The Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 50, 51-53 (1967). Negligence cases began to be reported about mid-nine-
teenth century. By the end of the century, negligence was a common theory of




employer's actions and the employee's injuries.6 Frequently, the employee
could not show that the employer had acted negligently.
7
The key feature of early workers' compensation statutes" were their
complete break from tort law principles. The employee no longer needed
to prove the employer's personal negligence9 because workers' compen-
sation statutes eliminated the need to show fault. Thus, an employee
could receive compensation for injury arising out of a risk created by his
employment, regardless of whether injury resulted from the negligence
of the employer or of a co-worker.1°
Early case law and legislative enactments set forth a workers' com-
pensation system which is, for the most part, unchanged today. Workers'
compensation statutes continue to exempt certain employees from par-
ticipation and more recent case law indicates that statutes containing
exclusive remedy provisions are a source of litigation for plaintiffs seeking
larger damage awards under traditional tort law theories."
However, the most litigated area of workers' compensation is statutory
interpretation. Because of the ambiguous language used by legislatures
to describe situations under which workers' compensation will be
awarded,1 2 disputes arise when an employee's injury occurs, arguably,
outside the scope of her employment. 13 In order to understand how and
when workers' compensation will be awarded, the statute of the relative
state must be examined.
Statutory interpretation is particularly important when the injury
arises at a company sponsored event. A determination that an injury
occurring at a recreational event arises out of and in the course of the
I Cudahy v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423 (1923); New York Central R.R. Co.
v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Friedman, supra note 5, at 53.
Friedman, supra note 5, at 53.
'Friedman, supra note 5, at 67-72. The break from tort law principles is still
a key feature of workers' compensation statutes to this day. See infra note 35.
1 Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911).
10 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION § 5.20, 5.30, 6.00, 6.10
(1990).
11 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981) (court held that
absent evidence of intentional contamination by the employer, workers' compen-
sation is the exclusive remedy for death resulting from plutonium poisoning),
rev'd, 464 U.S. 238 (1984), on remand, 769 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
476 U.S. 1104 (1986); Orzechowski v. Warner-Lambert Co., 92 A.D.2d 110, 460
N.Y.S.2d 64 (1983) (court held that acceptance of workers' compensation benefits
barred plaintiffs' cause of action for intentional tort against their employers);
Mitchell v. Hercules, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 560 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (court noted that
where the employer and employee both fall under the mandates of the state's
workers' compensation act, the employee is barred from bringing a common law
action for damages).
12 See generally notes 114, 115; AGS Machine Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 670
P.2d 816 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (court addresses whether employee participated in
recreational activity on own initiative as described in statute).
11 In terms of recreational activities, disputes about compensability invariably
turn on whether the injury was sustained from an injury outside the scope of the
workers' employment.
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workers' employment requires a broad interpretation of the policy behind
workers' compensation statutes. Once the injury is found to fall under
the coverage formula of the workers' compensation act, however, the
employee will be limited to workers' compensation as a remedy.
III. EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISIONS AND THE "ARISING OUT
OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT" TEST
Basic similarities exist among states' workers' compensation statutes.
Although there is similarity in language among the statutes, 14 there is
a lack of uniformity. As a consequence, an injury may be compensable
solely under the workers' compensation statute in one state while a sim-
ilar injury may fall outside the statute in another state.1 5 Likewise, the
14 Currently, forty-three states use the "arising out of and in the course of
employment" language to determine compensability of injury. A. Larson, supra
note 10, at § 6.10.
15 Most states set forth a specific schedule which outlines the type of injury
covered and the amount of recovery awarded for the injury. Typical of this is LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1221 (West 1985).
[Clompensation shall be solely for anatomical loss of use or amputation
and shall be as follows:
(a) For the loss of a thumb, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of wages
during fifty weeks.
(b) For the loss of the first finger, commonly called the index finger,
sixty-six and two-thirds percent of wages during thirty weeks.
(c) For the loss of any other finger, or a big toe, sixty-six and two-thirds
percent of wages during twenty weeks.
(d) For the loss of any toe, other than a big toe, sixty-six and two-thirds
percent of wages during ten weeks.
(e) For the loss of a hand, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of wages
during one hundred fifty weeks.
(f) For the loss of an arm, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of wages
during two hundred weeks.
(g) For the loss of a foot, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of wages during
one hundred twenty-five weeks.(h) For the loss of a leg, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of wages during
one hudnred seventy-five weeks.
(i) For the loss of an eye, sixty-six and two-thirds percent of wages during
one hundred weeks.
Compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(e) (Smith-Hurd 1988):
The following list amounts apply to either the loss of or the permanent and
complete loss of use of the member specified, such compensation for the
length of time as follows:
1. Thumb - 70 weeks
2. First, or index finger - 40 weeks and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.8(d)
(Smith-Hurd 1988):
... If the employee shall have sustained a fracture of one or more vertebra
or fracture of the skull, the amount of compensation allowed under this
section shall not be less than 6 weeks for fractured skull and 6 weeks for
each fractured vertebra.. . in the event the employee shall have sustained
a fracture of any of the following facial bones ... the amount of compensation





particular language adopted by the state determines to what extent and
under what circumstances an employee's injury is said to arise out of and
in the course of his employment for workers' compensation purposes.
Where the employee can show that the injury "aris[es] out of and in the
course of his employment" the injury will be compensable under the states'
workers' compensation statute.
6
In some instances, a finding that the injury arises out of and in the
course of employment will be a detriment to the employee, particularly
where the employee would receive a larger award under tort law. In
contrast, exclusive remedy provisions, which have been adopted in many
states, can be advantageous to the employer. These provisions can be
asserted by the employer as an affirmative defense when the employee
seeks to recover under tort theory.
1 7
A. Exclusive Remedy
Most state workers' compensation statutes contain exclusive remedy
provisions limiting an employee to workers' compensation as a remedy
and forbidding traditional tort remedies if the employee's injury falls
within the coverage formula of the statute.18 These provisions reflect the
development and philosophy behind workers' compensation statutes in
that employers were reluctant to participate in a state's workers' com-
pensation plan if there remained the possibility of tort liability.'9 From
the employer's standpoint, given that liability attaches regardless of fault,
employers felt that they were giving up a legal right to defend themselves
against injury claims. In exchange for relinquishment of this right, em-
ployers demanded assurance that all exposure to tort liability be elimi-
nated.20
Another important characteristic of workers' compensation statutes is
their limitation of recovery to injuries which result in a loss of earning
power.21 Consequently, an employer faced with a tort claim will try to
16 In re Question Submitted by U.S. Ct. of Appeals, 759 P.2d 17 (Colo. 1988).
17 Id. at 26. See also Johnson v. Arby's, Inc., 116 Mich. App. 425, 323 N.W.2d
427 (1982); In Re Agent Orange Products Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 210 (2d
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 695 (1988).
11 Id.; see also Georgia Ins. Co. v. Brown, 179 Ga. App. 687, 347 S.E.2d 290
(1986); Name Unpublished v. Southern Baptist Hospital, 415 So.2d 993 (La. Ct.
App. 1982).
19 Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
20 See Foley v. Kilbrick, 12 Mass. App. 382, 425 N.E.2d 376 (1981); Rathbun
v. Starr Commonwealth for Boys, 145 Mich. App. 303, 377 N.W.2d 872 (1985).
21 See, e.g., Doe v. South Carolina State Hosp., 285 S.C. 183, 328, S.E.2d 652
(Ct. App. 1985) in which the court held that the inadequacy of the state's workers'
compensation law to compensate for mental suffering does not enable the worker
to bring a separate cause of action in tort.
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prove that the injury is within the scope of the state's workers' compen-
sation statute, thereby limiting the employee's recovery to that set by
the statute.
2
Injuries caused by acts of rape, 23 exposure to an unsafe working
environment 24 and sexual harassment 25 have been held to fall within
states' workers' compensation statutes, thereby barring the employees'
tort actions. In these situations, recovery under a workers' compensation
statute is an inadequate remedy, because the only injury suffered by the
employee, in many cases, is psychological. 26 Unlike a broken leg, for
example, psychological injury is not thought to interfere with the em-
ployee's ability to continue working. Consequently, the worker is not
considered to have sustained an injury which results in a loss of earning
power and recovers nothing.27 A worker sustaining only non-physical
injury, therefore, could find herself in the unfortunate position of being
unable to recover any damages because of lack of physical injury whereas
a stranger to the employer might be able to recover substantial damages
for a similar injury using traditional tort law.28
Because of the harsh and sometimes inequitable results of the exclusive
remedy rule, some exceptions are recognized. If, for example, an employee
can show that the employer committed an intentional tort, the employee
will not be limited to workers' compensation as a remedy. 29 If an employee
22 Generally, the burden is on the employer to plead as an affirmative defense
that the injury falls within the workers' compensation law and that the worker
is limited to workers' compensation as a remedy. Doney v. Tambouratgis, 23 Cal.
3d 91, 587 P.2d 1160, 151 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1979). But see Le Flar v. Gulf Creek
Indus. Park Number Two, 511 Pa. 574, 515 A.2d 875 (1986) (exclusive remedy
provision is not an affirmative defense). When the injury occurs at a firm outing,
however, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the injury arose from his
employment. Martinson v. W-M Ins. Agency, Inc., 606 P.2d 256 (Utah 1980).
22 In re Question Submitted by U.S. Court of Appeals, 759 P.2d 17 (Colo. 1988).
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Sherbert, 646 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983).
25 Knox v. Combined Ins. of Am., 542 A.2d 363 (Me. 1988); see also O'Connell
v. Chasdi, 400 Mass. 686, 511 N.E.2d 349 (1987) where plaintiffs cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of a co-workers' sexual
harassment faces a challenge by the defendant that the claims were barred by
the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation act.
26 Doe v. South Carolina State Hosp., 285 S.C. 183, 328 S.E.2d 652 (Ct. App.
1985).
27 Id.
28 Id. This reflects the historical belief that workers, in exchange for certainty
of recovery for work related injuries, gave up common law forms of recovery. Cook
v. Macks Transfer & Storage, 291 S.C. 84, 86, 352 S.E.2d 296, 298 (Ct. App. 1986),
cert. denied, 292 S.C. 230, 355 S.E.2d 861 (1987).
In Aranda v. Ins. Co. of North Am., 748 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1988), the court
explained that a breach of the duty of good faith or an intentional tort are injuries
which are not job related and as such are not governed by workers' compensation
law. The company's affirmative defense that the plaintiff was limited to workers'
compensation as a remedy failed. Id. at 214. See also Copelin v. Reed Tool Co.,




suffers an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment
because of the negligence of a third party, the employee will be able to
recover against that third party using traditional tort law.
3 0 Finally, in
those cases in which the employer is a provider of services in addition to
being an employer, the "dual capacity doctrine" allows an employee to
recover tort damages from the employer.31
With respect to injuries sustained at recreational activities, exclusive
remedy provisions will work to the employer's advantage. Faced with the
tort claim of an employee injured at a recreational activity, the employer
can argue not only that it is not responsible for, and hence not liable for,
the injury but also that even if the employer is some how responsible for
the injury, the employee is limited to the remedy set out in the workers'
compensation statute.32 Because workers' compensation statutes cover
only loss of earning power, the employer's potential liability is much lower
than it would be under traditional tort law.
As with any work related injury, compensation for injury sustained at
a recreational activity would be limited to injury which results in a loss
of earning power. The employer, in some cases, may be able to argue that
a particular injury, though falling within the state's workers' compen-
sation law, is not compensable because it does not impact on the em-
ployee's ability to perform. Under this analysis, the executive's knee
injury sustained while sliding into third is compensable because it falls
under the coverage formula of the act, but no compensation is ever ac-
tually paid. This results from the fact that the injury, even if conceded
as work related, is not compensable because the injury does not effect the
executive's ability to sit at his desk and do his job. Like the noncom-
pensability for injury from rape or assault, psychological injury suffered
by the executive from the inconvenience caused by the injury would not
be compensable under workers' compensation.
In any situation where there is a question of workers' compensation as
the exclusive remedy, the relationship of the parties at the time the injury
occurred is first examined. 33 If the injury arose out of and in the course
of employment, the employee will be limited to workers' compensation
as a remedy absent the existence of one of the exceptions to the exclusive
remedy rule. The arising out of and in the course of employment language
m This is known as the third party exception and is applicable where, for
example, an employee is injured by machinery manufactured by someone other
than the employer. The risk of double recovery is eliminated by allowing a work-
ers' compensation lien on any amounts received. Wausau Ins. Co. v. Fuentes, 215
N.J. Super. 476, 522 A.2d 440 (1987) (state statute recognized right to proceed
against third party).
31 Firestein v. Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center, 137 A.D.2d 43, 528 N.Y.S.2d
85 (1988) (doctrine explained but not adopted by court).
32 Failure of the defendant to raise the defense that the claimant's sole remedy
is workers' compensation does not, however, necessarily preclude the defendant
from raising that issue at a later stage in the proceedings. See, e.g., Le Flar v.
Gulf Creek Indus. Park Number Two, 571 Pa. 574, 515 A.2d 875 (1986).
3 Hall v. Synalloy Corp., 540 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
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found in workers' compensation statutes establishes a two part test. The
first part of the test deals with the "arising out of" language. The second
part of the test deals with the "course of employment" language. Although
similar to the arising out of element, the course of employment element
differs in that it relates to the time, place, and circumstances under which
the employee sustained the injury, whereas the arising out of element
relates to the causal connection between the employment and the injury.3 4
B. Course of Employment
For workers' compensation purposes, an injury which takes place on
the employer's premises is deemed to have occurred in the course of
employment3 5 unless the employee's activity is wholly unrelated to the
employee's duties and more than incidental to his employment.3 6 Under
what is known as the "premises line rule,' 37 employees working at a fixed
location with established working hours are compensated for all injury
sustained while on the work premises, whether the injury occurs before
work, after work, or during a lunch period. 38 Premises can, however,
extend beyond the physical boundaries of the employee's location. If, for
example, the employee's job requires that she work off the physical prem-
ises of the employer, the premises of the employer will include the em-
3 Bybee v. Ozark Airlines, 706 S.W.2d 570, 572 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); State
Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 133 Cal. App. 3d 643,
184 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1982).
11 Some states include a definition of premises in their workers' compensationlaw. An example of this is found in DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2301 (1987) which
states:(15) Personal injury sustained by accident arising out of and in the course
of employment;(a) Shall not cover an employee except while he is engaged in, on or
about the premises where his services are being performed, which
are occupied by, or under the control of the employer (his presence
being required by the nature of his employment) or while he is
engaged elsewhere in or about his employer's business where his
services require his presence as part of such service at the time of
injury ...36 See, e.g., Rabbit Hash Ironworks, Inc. v. Strubel, 689 S.W.2d 606 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1985), in which the court held that an injury sustained while the employee
was in the process of constructing a stool for his wife was sustained while the
employee was engaged in an activity that was entirely personal and unrelated
to his employment duties.
31 General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 16 Cal. 3d 595, 546
P.2d 161, 128 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1976).
38 The rational for compensating workers for injury sustained during an unpaidlunch break taken on the employer's premises is that eating and refreshment
periods are viewed as basic necessities and that the employer benefits from these




ployee's location. A real estate agent 39 or salesman,40 therefore, who is
injured while working off premises, will be working within the course of
his employment.
In order for an injury to be in the course of employment, the injury
must have betn sustained while the employee was in an area authorized
by the employer.41 If the employee wanders into an unauthorized area,
42
or if the employee strays far from the route that the employer would
reasonably anticipate the employee would travel,43 then the employee
will not be considered to be acting in the course of her employment and
the injury sustained will not be compensable under workers' compensa-
tion.
When the employee's injury occurs off the employer's premises, focus
is placed on two variables: the degree of control retained by the employer
over the employee while off the premises and the level of consent given
by the employer for the employee's act.- The mere fact that the workers'
activity is voluntary and personal will not, in and of itself, preclude the
employee from recovery under workers' compensation statutes.4 Evi-
dence which shows that the employee was paid during the period, 4 that
19 Zoller v. Elliot Realty, 312 Minn. 595, 252 N.W.2d 857 (1977) (where real
estate agent is encouraged to socialize with clients, and agent is injured while
visiting at a client's home, injury is compensable under the state's workers' com-
pensation law).
o Husman Snack Foods v. Dillon, 591 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
41 Bybee v. Ozark Airlines, 706 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
42 In Chesser v. Louisville Country Club, 313 S.W.2d 410 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958)
a caddy at a country club, after chasing a cat into the boiler room, drank bottles
labeled whisky but which actually contained cleaning fluid, and sustained inju-
ries. The injury was held non-compensable on the grounds that the boiler room
did not comprise part of the employer's premises as related to the employee and
that the conduct of the caddy was "wholly unrelated to his employment by time,
place, or circumstance." Id. at 411.
Employee travel will be considered in the course of employment if undertaken
at the direction of the employer. This is known as the special mission or special
exception to the going and coming rule. Under the going and coming rule, the
employee cannot recover for injury sustained going to coming from his place of
employment. Green v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 187 Cal. App. 3d
1419, 1421, 1424, 232 Cal. Rptr. 465, 466, 469 (1986).
-Roache v. Indus. Comm'n of State of Colo., 729 P.2d 991 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
Compare Western Airlines v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 155 Cal. App.
3d 366, 202 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1984), with Helton v. Interstate Brands Corp., 155 Ga.
App. 607, 271 S.E.2d 739 (1980). In Western Airlines a flight attendant was raped
while on a 26 hour layover in Honolulu, Hawaii. The court held that the injury
did not occur in the course of the attendant's employment and that the attendant's
voluntary action, i.e., agreeing to go on a date with her assailant precluded her
from recovering under the workers' compensation law. In Helton, woman was
assaulted and raped while exiting her car after parking it in the employer's lot.
The court held that because the attack took place on the employer's premises and
parking was incident to her employment, the injury was compensable under the
workers' compensation laws.
15 Green v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1419, 232
Cal. Rptr. 465 (1986); Roache v. Indus. Comm'n of State of Colo., 729 P.2d 991
(Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
46Roache, 729 P.2d at 991.
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the activity was incidental to the employment, e.g., bathroom and coffee
breaks,47 or that the employer encouraged the employee to participate in
the off premises activity,48 will aid the employee attempting to recover
under a workers' compensation statute.
If, however, the employee participates in an activity which is wholly
unrelated to her employment and only for her personal benefit, she will
be barred from recovery under the workers' compensation statute.49 In
such a situation, the employee's location is irrelevant because the em-
ployee's activity will be outside the course of her employment and any
injury sustained thereof will not be compensable. 50 For example, an injury
sustained while the employee played pool in a recreation room provided
by the employer was determined to be non-compensable because the em-
ployee's participation in the game occurred after working hours and was
solely for the benefit of the employee.51
In relation to recreational activities, course of employment can become
the more important of the two elements because the employee's location
at the time of the injury is generally off premises. The relation of the
activity to the employment and the degree of personal benefit to the
employee is more closely scrutinized. In many cases, the activity of the
employee appears wholly personal since the activity is enjoyable and far
removed from the employee's usual job responsibilities. Where, for in-
stance, an employer invited one hundred and fifty of its employees to
participate in a weekend ski trip, it was difficult for the court to find any
benefit to the employer.52 From a purely practical standpoint this outcome
seems completely logical. Ski trips, rafting trips, and other "fun" outings
are viewed as perks for the employees. In some respects it seems unfair
to burden the employer with liability for injuries sustained at these en-
joyable events.
The mere fact that the employee gains a substantial personal benefit
from participating in the recreational activity should not impact on the
employee's right to compensation. As with injury sustained at the work-
place, the employee's injury resulting from participation in a firm outing
or social event arises as an incident of the employment. To say that
because the employee's participation is wholly personal, any injury sus-
tained is not compensable, denies the fact that the employer placed the
employee in the location at which the injury occurred. Given that the
employer chose to entice the employee to participate by inviting her to
partake in an enjoyable activity, any injury sustained occurs during the
course of employment.
41 Id. at 992.
- Id.
,1 Rogers v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 172 Cal. App. 3d 1195, 218
Cal. Rptr. 662 (1985) (where employee left employer's premises to cash check and
was assaulted upon return to workplace, the court held the fact that assault
occurred on employer's premises was a mere coincidence and, therefore, the injury
was not compensable under workers' compensation).
50 Taylor v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 416 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967).
5
'Id.




C. Arising Out of
Once the employee proves that her presence at the social event was in
the course of her employment, the employee must still prove the "arising
out of' element of the two part test. The arising out of element differs
from the course of employment element in that an injury which occurs
during the course of employment may not be compensable if it results
from a risk wholly unrelated to the employment and unforeseen.53 Such
a risk is said not to have arisen out of the employment and any injury
sustained thereof is not compensable. The risks presented by participation
at a recreational or social outing are special because they are not the
risks generally associated with the employee's job. Consequently, a special
type of risk analysis is necessary to establish the arising out of element
of the two part test.
For an injury to arise out of the course of employment, the employee
must show a causal connection between the injury suffered and the risk
connected with the employment which caused the injury.54 The injury
must be the direct and natural result of a risk presented by the employ-
ment. 5 No attention is given to questions of fault, but if the injury results
from a risk so attenuated and remote from the risks presented by the
employment, the employee's claim for workers' compensation will fail.
5 6
Four basic doctrines are used to determine if a given risk is closely
related to the employment: peculiar-risk doctrine, increased-risk doctrine,
actual-risk doctrine, and positional-risk doctrine.57 In a jurisdiction using
the peculiar-risk doctrine, the employee must show that the risk causing
the harm is "peculiar" to her particular line of work.58 This means that
if an employee was subjected to increased exposure to the elements be-
cause of her job, and therefore, sustained an injury, the employee's injury
would not be considered work related because exposure to the elements
is a risk suffered by all and not unique to her particular type of employ-
ment.59 Under the increased-risk doctrine, the employee need not show
that the risk is peculiar to her employment, but need only show that the
risk, though a risk suffered by all, was increased because of the employee's
53 See generally, Bybee v. Ozark Airlines Compensation Ins., 706 S.W.2d 570
(Mo. Ct. App. 1986); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Bd., 133 Cal. App. 3d 643, 184 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1982); Lemmon v. Indus.
Comm'n of Ariz., 740 P.2d 484 (Ct. App. 1986).
State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd.,
133 Cal. App. 3d 643, 649, 184 Cal. Rptr. 111, 116 (1982).
" Bluegrass Pastureland Dairies v. Meeker, 268 Ky. 722, 105 S.W.2d 611
(1937).
56Id. at 615.
57 A. LARSON, supra note 9, at § 6.00, § 6.20, § 6.30, § 6.40, § 6.50. Larson notes
that a fifth test, the proximate cause test, was used in older cases but is now
obsolete. A. LARSON, supra note 9, at § 6.60.
58 Today, the peculiar-risk doctrine is largely outmode as theory of risk analysis.
A. LARSON, supra note 9, at § 6.30.
59 A. LARSON, supra note 9, at § 6.20
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repeated exposure to it by her employment.60 The actual and positional-
risk doctrines define risk in broad terms, allowing a large number of
injuries to be considered as arising out of the employment. Actual-risk
jurisdictions hold that where it can be shown that the plaintiff was sub-
jected to the actual risk causing the harm because of her employment,
any injury caused by the risk is compensable under workers' compen-
sation.6
1
The most liberal of the doctrines, the positional-risk doctrine, uses a
but for standard. The employee's injury will be compensable where it is
shown that the employee's injury would not have occurred but for the
conditions of employment.6 2 Unlike the actual-risk doctrine, the employee
need not show that she was put at risk because of employment; she need
only show that the injury would not have occurred if she were not em-
ployed.63 Under this definition of risk, injuries resulting from assault,6 4
rape65 or death at the hands of a lunatic6 6 arise out of the employment
and the worker is limited to workers' compensation as a remedy.
Positional-risk analysis should be used in cases dealing with injury
sustained by an employee while participating in a company sponsored
social outing or recreational event. Under positional-risk analysis, an
injury sustained by an employee at a recreational activity would be com-
pensable since the injury would not have occurred but for the employee's
presence at the event. The positional-risk doctrine does not require that
the risk be anticipated by the employee or the employer.6 7 It is only
necessary that the risk, foreseen or unforeseen, result as an incident of
the employment.6 8
Because the risks presented by social outings are generally different
than the risks presented during the everyday work of the employee, the
risks causing the injury are usually unforeseen. If, for example, an em-
ployee sustains a head injury while driving into a lake during a social
outing, 69 such risks causing the injury are unforeseen. Although unfore-
seen, it cannot be said that these risks do not arise out of the recreational
activity, hence the positional-risk doctrine is well suited to analysis of
injuries sustained at recreational and social outings.
-
mIn re Question Submitted by U.S. Court of Appeals, 759 P.2d 17, n. 4 (Colo.
1988).
61 A. LARSON, supra note 9, at § 6.40.
Inland Mfg. Div. G.M.C. v. Lawson, 14 Ohio Misc. 129, 232 N.E.2d 657, aff'd,
15 Ohio App. 2d 192, 240 N.E.2d 100 (1967).
In re Question Submitted by U.S. Ct., of Appeals, 759 P.2d 17, 20-23 (Colo.
1983).
r.Id. at 24.
6 Doe v. South Carolina State Hos., 285 S.C. 183, 328 S.E.2d 652 (Ct. App.
1985).
66A. LARSON, supra note 9, at § 6.40.
67 In re Question Submitted by U.S. Ct. of Appeals 759 P.2d 17, 22 (Colo. 1983).
1 Id., supra note 64,





Applying positional-risk analysis to injuries sustained at company
sponsored events does not mean that the employer becomes liable for all
injuries sustained by an employee regardless of the source or cause of the
risk. Similar to an activity which is wholly unrelated to employment and
solely for the benefit of the employee, 70 where a risk is created by the
employee the risk will not be deemed to have arisen in the course of the
employment and will not be compensable under workers' compensation.
Risks created by the employee are personal to the employee and have no
connection to the employment activity, i.e., the recreational event.
71
The main objection to recognizing injury sustained at recreational ac-
tivities as compensable under worker compensation is that the employer
does not gain a benefit from the employee's participation in the activity,
consequently, there is not a sufficient nexus to work relation to allow for
compensation. As discussed below, the objection fails on two grounds.
First, the work relation is established by the fact that in most instances
there is a requirement, either implied or express, that the employee par-
ticipate in the event. Secondly, the employer does gain a benefit from the
employee's participation in the event. The benefit is the development of
good will between the employee and the employer and among the em-
ployees.
IV. APPLICATION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION To
INJURIES SUSTAINED AT COMPANY SPONSORED EVENTS
Courts use a variety of tests to determine whether injury sustained at
a company sponsored event is compensable under state worker compen-
sation law. Some state legislatures, in an attempt to create clearer guide-
lines for awarding compensation, have enacted provisions within their
workers' compensation statutes dealing directly with injury sustained at
a company sponsored event. These legislative enactments, however, have
complicated the problem. Although there is no precise definition or rule
to determine when recreational injury is compensable, some basic prin-
ciples can be used as a general outline to determine compensability. In
most cases, the injury would be compensable because the employer gains
a real benefit from the employee's participation and the employee usually
feels compelled to attend the event.
70 See, e.g., State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Workers' Compensation Appeals
Bd., 133 Cal. App. 3d 643, 184 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1982) (where injury arises from a
personal grievance between the injured employee and a third party, the injury
does not arise out of the employment and is not compensable under workers'
compensation laws.).
71 In Lemmon v. Indus. Comm'n of Ariz., 740 P.2d 484 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986),
the court applied this principle stating "overeating and drinking on the part of
the employee have their origin in purely personal motivations as opposed to the
employment relationship, [and] in the absence of indications [that] the employer
either directly or indirectly benefitted from such activities [injuries resulting
thereof are not compensable under workers' compensation]." Id. at 487.
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A. Compensable Injury: The Role of Compulsion by the Employer
Courts, in determining compensability of injury sustained at an outing
or recreational activity emphasize the level of compulsion felt by the
employee to attend the event. 72 If an employer requires an employee to
attend the activity, and the employee sustains injury while participating
in the event, the injury will be compensable under the state's workers'
compensation statute. 73 In most cases, however, there is not an actual
request by the employer to the employee to attend the social event. Com-
monly, there is a requirement that the employee participate in a business
activity which has a social activity annexed to it. Examples include meet-
ings which are followed by cocktail parties74 or recreational activities
awarded for a job well-done. 75 In these situations, the actual compulsion
placed on the employee to attend the mandatory function impacts on the
compulsion felt by the employee to attend the voluntary function.7 6 To
determine compensability in situations in which there are both manda-
tory and nonmandatory work activities, some courts use the dual purpose
test which allows for recovery when the business motive is concurrent
with the employee's personal interest.77
Notwithstanding its common use, the dominant purpose test is ill suited
to gauge compensability for injury sustained at a recreational activity
following a mandatory company function. The very fact that the function
72 The level of compulsion felt by the employee is important because it impacts
on the voluntariness of the activity. Generally, the less voluntary the activity
appears, the higher the likelihood of the injury falling within the state's workers'
compensation laws. See, e.g., Ricciardi v. Damar, 82 N.J. Super. 222, 197 A.2d
390 (1964), rev'd 45 N.J. 54, 211 A.2d 347 (1965), where the court discusses the
interplay between voluntariness of attendance and compensability of injury.
7'Campbell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 378 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964)(court notes that purely voluntary nature of function bars plaintiff from recovery
under workers' compensation law); Dynalectron v. Indus. Comm'n, 660 P.2d 915(Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (written invitation to employee and reprimand of employee
for tardiness indicates that employee was required to attend dinner, therefore
injury sustained while on "special errand" for employer and compensable).
74Blatter v. Missouri, 655 S.W.2d 819 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).75 Palermo v. Reliance Ins. Co., 501 So. 2d 333 (La. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied,
503 So. 2d 19 (La. 1987).
16 Id. at 343. See also, Whitney v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 373
So. 2d 728 (La. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 320 (La. 1979). In Whitney
the employee accompanied his employer to assist him in making repairs to a
camphouse located on the employer's hunting lease. While at the lease, the em-
ployer and employee decided to go on a quail hunt, during which the employee
was injured. The court held the injury compensable noting that the employee's
presence at the lease was at the direction of his employer.
17 Where an employee accompanied her employer on a number of errands then
went to a social gathering with her employer the purpose of which was to establish
a more positive working relationship, the injury sustained by the employee was
compensable. McBride v. Peony Corp., 84 N.C. App. 221, 352 S.E.2d 236 (1987).




was preceded by a mandatory function indicates that the dominant pur-
pose of the voluntary function is business related. Application of the
dominant purpose test requires that a distinction be made between when
the involuntary portion of the event ends and the voluntary portion be-
gins. Many times this distinction cannot be made; the voluntary function
is simply a continuation of the mandatory function.
A better approach to nonmandatory recreational functions that follow
mandatory functions is to accept them for what they are: work related
activities 8 Recreational activities that take place after mandatory firm
functions should be considered as falling within workers' compensation
statues. Under risk analysis, the risk causing injury is connected to the
employment. In addition, the actual compulsion on the employee requir-
ing her to attend the mandatory function creates an underlying implied
compulsion on the employee to attend the voluntary function.
79
Compensating an employee for injuries sustained at voluntary company
functions preceded by mandatory firm functions is justified under a va-
riety of forms of risk analysis. Using both the positional-risk doctrine 0
and the increased-risk doctrine'8 1 the injury sustained by the employee
at a firm function or outing aries out of and in the course of employment.
Positional-risk doctrine mandates that the employee's injury would not
have occurred but for the condition of the workers' employment. Where
an employee attends a mandatory function which is followed by a vol-
untary function, the employee's attendance at the voluntary function
would not have occurred but for the fact of the mandatory meeting. Be-
cause the employment required that the employee be at the location where
the harm occurred, the injury is sufficiently connected to the employee's
employment and any injury sustained should be compensable.
Compensability is also warranted under the increased-risk doctrine.
The requirement that the employee attend the mandatory function im-
pacts on the employee's decision to attend the voluntary function. 2 Once
the employee decides to attend the voluntary function because of actual
or implied compulsion on the part of the employer, any risk of harm that
71 See, e.g., Ski World, Inc. v. Fife, 489 N.W.2d 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (court
notes that recreational events held for purpose of developing employee relations
gives employer direct business benefit of increased efficiency); Dorman v. New
Process Gear Div., 41 A.D.2d 8, 353 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1974); Jewel Tea Co. v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 6 Ill.2d 304, 128 N.E.2d 699 (1955).
19 See, e.g., Pepco, Inc. v. Ferguson, 734 P.2d 1321 (Okl. Ct. App. 1987).
10 In re Question Submitted by U.S. Ct. of Appeals, 759 P.2d 17 (Colo. 1983).
81 A. LARSON, supra, note 9, § 6.00.
82 Dymaletren v. Indus. Comm'n, 660 P.2d 915 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (injury
sustained by an employee at a cocktail party following a mandatory meeting is
held compensable on grounds that the informal gathering was incident to the
employment and that it was natural and reasonable for the employee to attend
the cocktail party); Cellura v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 36 A.D.2d 868; 320 N.Y.S.2d
191 (1971).
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is increased by participation should be compensable under the workers'
compensation statute. The employment, by requiring the employee's at-
tendance and participation in the recreational activity, increases the em-
ployee's exposure to risk by placing the employee in an environment
containing risk. If for instance, a company holds a meeting at a ski resort
and the employee suffers an injury while skiing during a free period, the
injury should be compensable because the worker was exposed to an
increased risk of suffering a ski injury as a result of her employment.
The fact that the employee was acting for personal enjoyment and that
the skiing activity was not compelled by the employer is irrelevant. The
employer, by scheduling a meeting in a recreational environment, tacitly
encouraged the employee's participation in the available recreational
activities thereby increasing the risk that the employee would suffer a
recreational injury. 3
In cases where the recreational activity is not preceded by a mandatory
firm function, courts are more apprehensive about awarding compensa-
tion.84 This is due to a number of factors, but two factors appear to be
overriding. Recreational activities which do not have a mandatory func-
tion connected are viewed as purely voluntary and unrelated to the em-
ployee's professional life. This factor can be overcome by showing that
there was an implied compulsion on the employee to attend the event.
The second factor, however, is more difficult to overcome. Courts are
reluctant to award compensation to employees who sustain injury at
completely voluntary recreational activities because they fail to see the
benefit which accrues to the employer from the employee's participation.
The absence of a recognizable benefit to the employer from an employ-
ee's participation in a completely voluntary recreational activity requires
courts to focus on the implied compulsion felt by an employee when asked
to participate in a voluntary company function.8 5 Many times, a company's
social gatherings are viewed by employees as an integral part of their
employment duties.86 Company outings give an employee an opportunity
Approval by the employer for employee participation in activities generally
thought to be personal to the employee and independent of the employee's duties
has been held to support the inference that the injury arose out of and in the
course of employment. See Cabin Crafts, Inc. v. Pelfrey, 119 Ga. App. 809, 168
S.E.2d 660 (1969); Zengotita v. New York Tel. Co., 58 A.D. 930, 396 N.Y.S.2d 921
(1977).
See, generally, Riggen v. Paris Printing, 559 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977);
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Musech, 562 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978); Action, Inc.
v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 540 A.2d 1377 (1982); Harris v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Bd., 51 Pa. Commw. 470, 414 A.2d 765, (1980); Campbell
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 378 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
5 Some courts seem to stress the fact that the firm function was considered
voluntary by the employer rather than focusing on the actual perception of the
employee regarding the level of voluntariness. Ricciardi v. Damar Prod. Co., 82
N.J. Super. 222, 197 A.2d 390 (1964), rev'd, 45 N.J. 54, 211 A.2d 347 (1965);
Campbell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 378 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
Campbell v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 378 S.W.2d 354 (Texas Civ. App. 1964);





to interact with her superiors in an informal setting conducive to candid
discussion about personal goals and prior achievements. Informal gath-
erings are an important part of the employee's employment because the
personal relationships established at informal social gatherings can im-
pact on later career advancement.
8 7
This is particularly true for low level executives whose futures depend
on upper management's personal feelings. An employee perceived as out-
going, comfortable in social settings and a team player has a much greater
chance for advancement than one viewed as introverted and uninterested
in making contacts outside the workplace. Social gatherings are used by
firms to draw out the employee's personality. Impressions made by the
employee at the social function give rise to certain presumptions about
the employee's leadership abilities, cooperativeness, and managerial
skills.8
Evidence of the important role that social outings play is found in
typical employee review forms which rank employees on the basis of their
attitude toward their work. Participation in firm outings solidifies the
employer's perception that an employee has a positive attitude about her
job and that the employee is an asset to the company. 9
Because a significant amount of the time spent at a recreational activity
is devoted to cultivating work relationships which will aid the employee
in the furtherance of her career, such functions should be viewed as an
extension of the employment duties and should be compensable under
the workers' compensation statutes. Refusal to recognize social gatherings
as an important aspect of modern business denies the true nature of
modern industrialization 90
87 Lipman, Firms' Outings Pose Liability Dilemma, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1988,
at 37, col. 3; Auto-Trol Technology Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 189 Ill. App.3d
1065, 545 N.E.2d 939 (1989).
8 Even where the employer testifies that the activity was solely for the enjoy-
ment of the employees and completely voluntary, most employers will concede
that the outings also serve the purpose of giving upper management a chance to
meet with subordinates to discuss their future goals. See generally, Ricciardi v.
Damar Prod. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 222, 197 A.2d 390 (1964), rev'd, 45 N.J. 54, 211
A.2d 347 (1965); Husman Snack Foods v. Dillon, 591 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979)
8 Smith v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 191 Cal. App. 3d 127, 236 Cal.
Rptr. 248 (1987).
In his concurring opinion in Ricciardi, Judge Lewis noted that:
The realities of the commercial world command the recognition that social
business interludes to stimulate goodwill, espirit de corps and better rela-
tions between employer and employee are desirable business accomplish-
ments.
Ricciardi v. Damar Prod. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 222, 232, 197 A.2d 390, 396 (1964),
rev'd, 45 N.J. 54, 211 A.2d 347 (1965).
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B. Good Will - A Real Benefit to the Employer
Social outings develop goodwill9 l among employees and between em-
ployees and management. Goodwill is a real benefit to the employer and,
as such, should be given more credence by courts. Traditionally, courts
have limited benefit analysis to identifying an action by the employee
which can be said to further a business interest of the employer92 In
defining business interest, some courts look for a direct benefit to the
employer. 93 Courts which use direct benefit analysis refuse to compensate
for injury sustained at social outings on grounds that the benefit of good
will is not a true benefit to the'employer and that participation in the
activity benefits only the employee.9 4 This type of analysis, however, fails
to recognize that in a modern industrial society, the intangible benefit of
good will is just as important to a company as the benefit derived from
the everyday labor expended by the company's employeesf' Goodwill aids
the efficiency of a company's operation by nurturing cooperation and team
work among employees and is an important asset to the employer96
91 Goodwill, for the purposes of this note, includes developing comraderie and
a sense of unity among the firm's employees as well as a show of appreciation by
the employer for a job well done.92 Where a camp employee died in an off premises canoeing accident while onbreak the court held that the injury was not compensable because the employee
was not "actually engaged in the furtherance of the business or affairs of the
employer." Harris v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 51 Pa. Commn. 470,473, 414 A.2d 765, 767 (1980). See also, Briar Cliff College v. Campolo, 360 N.W.2d91 (Iowa 1984) (court holds employee's participation in intermural basketball
game gave substantial direct benefit to employer). The "furtherance of the busi-
ness or affairs of the employer" test is used often in cases where the employee is
traveling on business. Under this standard, any injury sustained during the
business trip is compensable because the act of traveling furthers a business
interest of the employer. In re Melinda Capizzi, 61 N.Y.2d 50, 459 N.E.2d 847,
471 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1984).
93 In Dynalectron v. Indus. Comm'n, 660 P.2d 915 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983), the
court held that injury sustained at a dinner sponsored by the employer was
compensable under workers' compensation because the employer received a directbenefit from the employee's attendance by conducting business at the dinner.
Many workers' compensation acts use "furtherance of the business affairs of the
employer" in the statute. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 77 § 411(1) (Purdon 1988).
Wilson v. Scientific Software-Intercomp, 738 P.2d 400 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987);
Gray v. State, 205 Neb. 853, 290 N.W.2d 651 (1980); Crowe v. Home Indem. Co.,
145 Ga. App. 873, 245 S.E.2d 75 (1978).
15 Companies are placing much more emphasis on developing both the personal
and professional lives of their employees. Levi Strauss & Co. distributes paper
weights to its employees which read:
We want satisfaction from accomplishments and friendships, balanced per-
sonal and professional lives, and to have fun in our endeavors.
Solomon, Defining Values, Not Just Goals, Wall St. J., Jan. 30, 1989, at B1, col.1. This is a clear indication of the increasing merge between work relationships
and social relationships.
916 In the Riccardi opinion, the court notes that:
[W]here... the employer sponsored a recreational event for the purpose of
maintaining or improving relations with and among employees, the em-
ployees gratify the employers wish by attending and thus serve a business
aim. It therefore is correct to say the legislature intended the enterprise to
bear the risk of injuries incidental to that company event.




As companies recognize that the employee's good health, fitness and
positive mental attitude benefits them through higher efficiency and co-
operation, more steps are taken by the employer to ensure the well-being
of employees. The advent of on-premise fitness centers,
97 motivational
training seminars98 and employee counseling 9 evidence an increased
awareness on the part of the employer that cultivation of the intangible
benefit of goodwill translates into the tangible benefit of higher efficiency
at the workplace. Off-premises social and recreational activities sponsored
by the employer merely extend this philosophy. Employer sponsored rec-
reational activities are not only for the personal benefit of employees, but
rather help to achieve increased efficiency at the workplace by fostering
goodwill among employees.
The fact that the employer seeks the intangible benefit of goodwill,
adds to the compulsion felt by the employee to attend the company spon-
sored event. Even where the event is described by the employer as wholly
voluntary, in many cases the employee will feel compelled to attend be-
cause of peer pressure or repeated requests by the employer that the
employee attend. 100 The level of implied compulsion is important when
it is unclear whether the injury can be said to arise from the employment.
A finding that there was an implied compulsion on the employee to attend
the function should give rise to the presumption that the employer spon-
sored the event with an intent to foster better employee relations; there-
fore, any injury sustained by the employee at the event should be com-
pensable under workers' compensation statutes on the ground that the
injury arose out of and during the course of employment.
C. Proposed Reform: Setting the Standard for Compensability
Currently, courts are split on the compensability of injury sustained at
recreational activities. The case law in this area conflicts and it is difficult,
therefore, to predict the outcome of any given case. A lawyer presented
with a claim for recovery for injury sustained at a recreational activity
must make a number of difficult decisions which can effect the outcome
of her client's claim. The lawyer can immediately apply for workers'
97Lipman, Firm's Outings Pose Liability Dilemma, Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1988,
at 37, col. 3.98 Main, Merchants of Inspiration, FORTUNE, June 6, 1987, at 69.
9 Heizberg, One More Time: How Do You Motivate Your Employees?, Harv.
Bus. Rev., Jan., 1963, at 53.
100 Implied compulsion aries where it is reasonable for the employee to believe
that her attendance is required at the social event or that attendance at the social
event, though voluntary, is strongly recommended by the employee's supervisors.
Hughes Aircraft v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 149 Cal. App. 3d 571,
196 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1983); Dynalectron v. Indus. Comm'n, 660 P.2d 915 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1983); Jones v. TRW Inc., 139 Mich. App. 751, 362 N.W.2d 801 (1984); Pepco,
Inc. v. Ferguson, 734 P.2d 1321 (Okl. Ct. App. 1987).
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compensation benefits. The award of benefits, however, bars her client
from a larger recovery utilizing traditional tort law. Doing so could prove
costly for both the client and attorney because the employer may raise
the affirmative defense that the employee is limited to workers' compen-
sation as a remedy, or the court may simply hold that the workers' com-
pensation board must first determine whether the injury arose during
the course of the employment before the claim can be brought.10 Both
outcomes mean increased litigation costs. This area of the law needs to
be reformed and by using general guidelines borrowed from other areas
of the law a standard can be established to predict whether recreational
activity is compensable.
A reasonableness standard should be used to determine whether em-
ployee attendance at the social outing was expected. Evidence can be
presented to establish that the compulsion felt by the employee was rea-
sonable under the facts of a given case. Evidence which shows that the
employer encouraged the employee to attend the recreational activity,o2
that the majority of the company's workers attended the event, 0 3 that
the employer actively participated in the planning of the event,104 or that
the employer paid for the event 0 5 will substantiate an employee's claim
that there was an implied compulsion to attend the event. This list is not
exclusive and it should not be necessary that a specific number of factors
be present to award compensation; rather general guidelines such as these
can be used to determine compensability. Whether it was reasonable for
the employee to feel compelled to attend the social outing should be a
question of fact for the jury, and at least one court has held that the
slightest indication of compulsion gives rise to a presumption of com-
pensability.1°6
The level of the employee's participation is a way to measure the benefit
that the employer expects to derive from the recreational activity. Evi-
dence similar to that which shows that the employee was compelled to
attend the event should be used to show that the employer intended to
derive a benefit from the sponsorship of the event. For instance, evidence
101 Palmer v. Bean, 636 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
102 Ricciardi v. Damar Prod. Co., 82 N.J. Super. 222, -, 197 A.2d 390, 392
(1964), rev'd, 45 N.J. 54, 211 A.2d 347 (1965); Tietz v. Hastings Lumber Mart,
Inc., 297 Minn. 230, 210 N.W.2d 236 (1978).
103 Grant v. Brownfield's Orthopedic, 105 Idaho 542, 671 P.2d 455 (1983) (fact
that nine of twelve workers attended Christmas Party sponsored by employer
helps substantiate plaintiff's claim that injury falls within workers' compensa-
tion).
104 Wallace v. Shade Tobacco Growers' Agricultural Ass'n, 642 F.2d 17 (1st Cir.
1981).
105 Id. at 20.
106 In Jackson v. Cowden Mfg., 578 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978), the court,
citing Spurgeon v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 469 S.W.2d 550 (Ky. 1971), states:
... [f the slightest degree of compulsion is practiced by employer then it
must be presumed that the activity engaged in is incidental to the interests





that the employer paid for the activity,
10 7 planned and managed the
activity 10 8 or was recognized in the community as actively supporting and
encouraging the activity, s09 creates the inference that the employer per-
ceived the activity as incident to the employment and that the employer
expected to receive some benefit from the employee's participation in the
event. The benefit sought to be gained is an increased feeling of goodwill
which contributes to increased efficiency at the workplace.
The combination of work related benefit to the employer (increasing
efficiency by raising goodwill) and the implied compulsion felt by the
employee to attend the social or recreational outing justifies awarding
workers' compensation benefits. Implied compulsion and goodwill benefit
to the employer are often difficult to measure, but difficulty alone should
not be the basis for denying the employee compensation. Because of the
difficulty in determining when to award benefits for injury sustained at
a recreational activity, some states have enacted statutes outlining the
circumstances under which workers' compensation is available to an em-
ployee who sustains injury at a company function. But these statutes, in
most instances, complicate the issue by setting standards as ambiguous
as judicially developed standards.
D. Legislative Action
California's Workers' Compensation Act contains a provision which
specifically deals with injury sustained by an employee at a recreational
function. The provision, which is typical of legislation of this type, states
that:
[injury is compensable where] ... the injury does not arise out
of voluntary participation in an off duty recreational, social or
athletic activity not constituting part of the employee's work-
related duties, except where these activities are a reasonable
expectancy of, or are expressly or impliedly required by the
employment .... 110 (Emphasis added)
A variation of this type of statute is found in Ohio's Workers' Compen-
sation Act which uses waiver as a vehicle to limit liability for injury
sustained at recreational events."' Massachusetts Workers' Compensa-
107 Wallace v. Shade Tobacco Growers' Agricultural Ass'n, 642 F.2d 17, 20 (1st
Cir. 1981).
108 Id. at 20.
109 Consistent support of an employee's involvement in a community youth
baseball team and an established policy of community service dictates that an
injury sustained by the employee while on the way to a youth baseball meeting
is compensable under the workers' compensation act. Pepco, Inc. v. Ferguson, 734
P.2d 1321, 1324 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987)
110 Cal. Labor Code § 3600(a)(9) (West 1989).
1' OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.01 (Baldwin 1988).
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tion Act excludes recovery for injuries resulting from an employee's
"purely voluntary participation in any recreational activity, including
but not limited to athletic events, parties, and picnics even though the
employer pays some or all of the costs thereof." 12
The California statute, by using a "reasonable expectancy of employ-
ment" test, allows the greatest amount of coverage. Under this test, an
employee can recover for his injury where the employee "subjectively
believes his or her participation in an activity is expected by the employer
and where that belief is objectively reasonable."'1 3 Some California courts
view the statute as an indication that the legislature wishes to limit the
employer's liability for injury sustained at a recreational event."1 4 A better
approach, however, is to view the statute as merely setting a standard
against which implied compulsion can be measured. 1 5 Given that the
legislature chose to use the words "subjectively believes" the latter inter-
pretation appears to be correct.
Attempts by legislatures to limit the kinds of recreational activities
which are compensable is problematic because the factors used to deter-
mine whether such an injury is compensable are too esoteric to fit into a
legislative scheme. It is not enough simply to say that voluntary partic-
ipation in recreational activity is not compensable. Participation is vol-
untary only to the extent that the employee does not feel compelled to
attend. The use of words such as "implied" or "subjectively believes"
admits that injury sustained at a recreational event is compensable given
the right set of circumstances. Legislatures, although the birth place of
workers' compensation law, are incapable of reconciling the problems of
liability for injury sustained at recreational activities. Workers' compen-
sation boards (and the courts when necessary) can resolve these problems
if the legislatures make a clear statement that injuries sustained at rec-
reational activities are compensable, as a general rule, and that excep-
tions to this rule should be developed by the courts and workers'
compensation boards.
"I MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 152, § 1 (7A) (West 1988).
113 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 187
Cal. App. 3d 922, 232 Cal. Rptr. 257, 262 (1986) (citing Ezzy v. Workers' Com-
pensation Appeals Bd., 146 Cal. App. 3d 252, 194 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1983)).
- "The purpose of [§ 3600 (a)] was to ensure the employer could provide vol-
untary off-duty recreational, social, and athletic benefits for his employees per-
sonal use without also bearing the expense of insuring the employee for worker's
compensation benefits during participation in those activities." Hughes Aircraft
Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 149 Cal. App. 3d 571, 196 Cal. Rptr.
904 (1983)
"' Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 187
Cal. App. 2d 922, 232 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1986) (court views § 3600(a) as an attempt
by the legislature to limit indirect pressure by the employer to compel employees
to participate in company sponsored events; court notes that evidence showing
that the employer used express or implied pressure to stimulate employee in-




E. The Nineteenth Century Revisited: The Hidden Value of
Compensating for Injuries Sustained at Recreational Events.
Opposition' 1 6 to compensating for injury sustained at a recreational or
social activity is misplaced because it focuses on the argument that com-
pensating for such injury will result in increased costs to the employer.
This argument, which mirrors arguments made by industrialists almost
a century ago,117 is faulty because its basic premise, - that compensating
recreational activity will be costly for employers, is untrue. Recent case
law indicates that compensating an employee for this type of injury will
actually save the employer money because doing so eliminates the em-
ployer's exposure to tort liability.
Where, for example, the employer sponsored a picnic for its manage-
ment employees and the plaintiff was stabbed by a co-worker, the plaintiff
sought tort recovery rather than workers' compensation."
8 The plaintiff
argued that the employer was negligent in "failing to provide a safe
premises for the picnic and failing to provide adequate supervision."
1 9
The employer's response was that the employee failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted and that the employee's claim was
barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the state's workers' compen-
sation statute. 20 On appeal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment
for the employer, the appellate court held that the compensability of the
employee's injury was a factual determination to be made by the workers'
compensation board; therefore, the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment was improper.' 21 According to the court, should the workers' com-
pensation board find the injury non-work related, the employee would
then be allowed to proceed with his tort claim.
22
This case, and others like it,12' illustrate the need to recognize injuries
sustained at recreational activities as work related. The current state of
this area of workers' compensation law leads to conflicting and confusing
results. Employees, in an attempt to reap larger awards under tort prin-
ciples, are turning employer's arguments against them. It is now the
employee who "contends that [the company outing] was a purely social
116 Companies have devised some ingenious ways to avoid liability for injury
sustained at company sponsored events. For example, 3M Company has estab-
lished the 3M club which is a not for profit corporation funded by membership
dues paid by employees and revenues derived from vending machines located on
the employer's premises. The purpose of the club is to organize and sponsor
recreational activities for 3M employees. When faced with a compensation claim
by an employee who participated in a 3M club event, the 3M Company argued
that the 3M club was a separate legal entity and that is had no connection to
that entity. The court held that the employee's injuries did not arise out of and
in the course of the employee's employment. 3M Co. v. Illinois Indust. Comm'n,
78 Ill.2d 182, 399 N.E.2d 612 (1979).
117 Friedman, supra note 5, at 60, 63, 64.
I'8 Johnson v. Arby's Inc., 116 Mich. App. 425, 323 N.W.2d 427 (1982).
119 Id. at 428.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 430.
122 Id. at 430.
123 Beckam v. Estate of Brown, 100 N.M. 1, 664 P.2d 1014 (Ct. App. 1983).
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event given for the employees."124 Employers, in an attempt to limit li-
ability, argue that "substantial business-related benefits were to be de-
rived from the social gathering126 and that compensating for injury
sustained during a company outing is consistent with "a humanitarian
and economic system for compensating injured workmen and their fam-
ilies."126
Implementing a system whereby injuries sustained at a recreational
activity or social outing are routinely compensated will be cost effective
and in keeping with the general policy of workers' compensation statutes
that an employee be compensated for work related injury. Like general
workers' compensation principles, exceptions to compensability would
exist when the employee acts outside the scope of the recreational activity,
e.g., voluntary intoxication.127 Refusing to recognize injuries sustained at
company sponsored recreational activities or social outings as compens-
able only complicates existing problems and stifles the evolution of work-
ers' compensation law.
V. CONCLUSION
Compensating employees for injuries sustained at company sponsored
recreational activities or social outings is fair, in the interests of public
policy, and in keeping with the spirit of workers' compensation law. As
in the early days of workers' compensation law, the opposition of em-
ployers to recovery for injury sustained at a recreational event is premised
upon the belief that it would be cost prohibitive to compensate for such
injury. But when examined in a broader perspective, compensating em-
ployees for recreational injury can be cost efficient since workers' com-
pensation statutes cover only damages sustained from loss of earning
power and an award of workers' compensation benefits cuts off recovery
under traditional tort liability.
Companies are able to assume the risk of recreational injury. Workers'
compensation was founded on the belief that the cost of work related
injury should be borne by the party best able to assume it, and that party
is the employer. Employee involvement in recreational activities is an
extension of the duties of employment. The fact that the employee may
gain some personal benefit and that the activity is not directly related
to the employee's job description should not bar the employee from re-
covery under the state's workers' compensation statute.
14 Johnson v. Arby's Inc., 116 Mich. App. 425, 323 N.W.2d 427, 429 (1982).125 Id. at 429.
126 Beckam v. Estate of Brown, 664 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Ct. App. 1983).
127 If, however, the employer encourages the employee to consume alcohol, the
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Modern industry has changed the workplace from the traditional as-
sembly line to a broad range of work environments. Off-premises recre-
ational activities and social outings should be considered part of the work
environment. In the highly complex corporate structure, cooperative in-
teraction between employees determines profitability of a company. Rec-
reational activities are an integral part of developing cooperation and
efficiency and, as such, are work related. As a result, injury sustained
while participating at one of these events should be compensable under
the workers' compensation statutes.
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